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1Yasunari Takada
In March 2008 I was invited to participate in the Symposium entitled “Popular 
Memory and the Formation of Identities,” which was to be held at the 
Lebanese American University, Beirut. This famous city, the “Paris in the 
Middle East,” was full of perils and dangers as it now is. Thrilled by a sense of 
adventure and allured by the city's cultural density, however, I inadvertently 
and on the spur of the moment accepted the invitation without recognizing the 
utter complexities of the problem, which are subsumed under the theme of the 
symposium. At the last moment in preparation, being at my wits' end, I thought 
I had no choice but to tell something about my experience in regard to 
“collective memory” and “national identity.”  
1. The death of Emperor Showa in 1989
From the instant of his death to the staging of his burial some forty days later, 
the state choreographed an elaborate dance representing constitutionality and 
mystery, Western modernity and Eastern tradition. The dance had to suggest a 
history at once progressive and alluring, glossing adroitly over the interlude of 
war to elaborate the forty years of postwar prosperity.1）
It was on 7 January 1989 when the whole world was about to experience the 
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1） Norma Field, In the Realm of A Dying Emperor (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), p. 20.
2collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Tiananmen Square Incident that Emperor 
Showa, better known as Emperor Hirohito, died on the islands of Japan and 
Japanese society, for no other reason than that, came to a halt in its entirety. 
The contrast to the other incidents cannot be sharper: while in Berlin and 
Beijing people were claiming and expressing their own individual rights and 
freedom, people in Japan were absorbed, if only for several months, in a magical 
zone of collective memory and destiny. As if to defy the modernization move 
elsewhere, Japanese society, for one, seemed to exemplify the myth of the 
Arthurian legend in medieval Europe, the dying king with the corresponding 
mortal effects on all that surround him, from nature, the realm and cities to his 
people. The Emperor's crisis in his natural body found its direct reverberation 
in his political body.
　　　　Particularly extraordinary about the crisis of the Emperor's body was 
the almost abnormal behavior of the whole society for over four months from 
his collapse on September 19, 1988 up until his death on January 7, 1989. For 
those of you who do not believe that such a phenomenon was taking place in 
one of the most advanced countries of the world, Norma Field, a distinguished 
student of Japanese studies, who happened to be there and then on the spot as 
an eyewitness, provides us a trustworthy report: “Daily reverential reporting 
on the body of the emperor throughout the island nation both provoked and 
reinforced a massively orchestrated exercise in “self-restraint,” or jishuku, a 
newly popularized word.”2） In the national promotion of “self-restraint” 
innumerable activities and forms of conduct, daily or otherwise, fell victim one 
after another to the pressure of collectivism, ranging from the omission of 
felicitous phrases such as “nice day” from commercials, and of alcohol from 
political fund-raisers, seasonal neighborhood festivals, weddings etc., etc. 
2）Ibid., p. 21.
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　　　　Now this was as recent as 1989, when people in Japan as well as the 
whole outside world took it for granted that they had managed to accomplish 
successful, if not straightforward, modernization, carrying with them eventually 
the distinguished modern passports of capitalism and scientific technology, 
freedom and equality, democracy and individual human rights. Some among the 
optimistic even went so far as to fancy that Japan was now already well into 
the stage of postmodernism. But then, quite suddenly and willy-nilly, the 
recognition was forced upon them of the existence at a subconscious level of a 
collective memory, which was powerful enough to nullify almost all the 
essential passports they thought they had obtained for the community of 
modernity.  
2. The anatomy of the collective memory
But what was this extraordinary collective memory, which apparently was 
actualized not on the (self-)conscious but on a subconscious level by the crisis 
of the Emperor's body? Obviously it has closely to do with the modern history 
of Japan which has accrued in the people's memory, especially that of the 
period of his reign from 1926 to 1989, the truly eventful period marked by the 
Great Depression, the Second World War (or to be more precise, the Pacific 
War), the defeat at the end of it, and the postwar recovery. But this historical 
contingency alone won't explain what may be termed the “anti-modern” or 
“pre-modern” behaviour that Japanese society characteristically showed at the 
crisis of the Emperor's body. Such a sudden powerful eruption of the anti- or 
pre-modern urge in a nation which regarded itself as modernized and advanced 
suggests the existence of some underlying structure of complicity between 
modern and pre-modern elements in Japanese modernity itself. Briefly put, 
4there seem to be three mnemonic components that were at work to produce 
the social crisis along with the crisis of Emperor's body: (1) the structure of 
national psychology peculiar to the late modernizer, (2) the adoption of the 
restoration model in the move towards modernization, (3) the divine and 
human spectrum of respect accorded to Emperor Showa in the vicissitudes of 
history.
3.  The double structure of national consciousness in Japanese 
modernity
The history of modern Japan as a nation-state began in 1868 when the last 
tycoon of the feudal government of the Tokugawa dynasty surrendered its 
sovereignty to Emperor Meiji, who thereby restored the ancient imperial rule. 
As a drastic change of political power, it was a revolution but in terms of 
national psychology it was a revival of the interrupted tradition, “the 
Restoration of the Imperial Rule,” as every (nationally) authorized history 
textbook describes it. Japanese modernity, first and foremost, is therefore a 
composite state of affairs, a mixture of elements new and old, both politically 
and culturally.  It was the function of the emperor, as a symbolic embodiment 
both of the new identity and of traditional authority, to combine these 
contradictory elements in one body and smoothe them out as the leader of the 
nation.
　　　　Not only was it a conglomeration of forward-looking revolution and 
backward-oriented restoration, of the modern and the traditional, but this 
newly-formed empire nation had the appearance of being violently forced to 
come out onto the international scene.  Since the early 17th century Japan had 
adopted a self-imposed policy of isolationism toward the outside world, and it 
was in 1868, simultaneously with the revolution/restoration of modern Japan, 
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that the country officially and fully opened its doors to foreigners.  But it did 
not do so altogether willingly.  The truth of the matter is that it had to give up 
the policy of isolationism under the threat of the warship diplomacy of Western 
colonizing powers. It is true that those revolutionaries who attempted the 
subversion of the ancien regime took advantage of this threat from outside, but 
after obtaining power, they were soon to find themselves obliged to cope with 
the same threat. It was probably the fate of any latecomer in the nation-
building business in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century when the 
Western colonialist endeavour was rife that it should suffer more or less from a 
sense of self-victimization. At least in the Japanese case, this feeling of self-
victimization appears to have been so deeply ingrained that it has become 
hardly possible to imagine the nation without any residual trace of this feeling 
of self-victimization. Differently put, behind any positive assertion of national 
identity runs an undercurrent of the sense of being a victim of circumstances. 
It is a function of the emperor again to embody in one body these two 
contradictory kinds of passions.
　(a) The reductive character of the double structure
As has been noted above, the contradictory double structures are prevalent in 
the national culture of Japanese modernity.  But the contradiction was there 
not just to be reconciled as such but (one supposes) to be harmonized in the 
person and body of the emperor as the means of opening up the nation's sphere 
of influence.  But how?  About this historical state of affairs, we have two 
opposite views, one from inside, the other from outside. A typical instance of 
the harmonization of contradiction is the so-called “wakon-yosai”, literally the 
Japanese Spirit combined with Western knowledge. If the modernization is a 
historical inevitability for Japan to take on itself in order to survive in the age 
6of Western imperialism and colonization, then let it learn as much as it can 
from the West in the fields of science and technology, but leave the Japanese 
Spirit intact as it eminently stands because there is nothing to learn from the 
West in the spiritual realm. More than that, with the excellence of Western 
knowledge of science and technology combined with the eminence of the 
Japanese spirit, as the ideologues of the “wakon-yosai” fancied, there cannot be 
a more ideal mixture of two great civilizations. Such is the happy view from 
within.
　　　　Preditably, the outsider's view was severe and critical, as represented 
by the German émigré Karl Loewith, an eminent philosopher who happened to 
come to Japan towards the end of the interwar period. His verdict of modern 
Japan as he saw it was without any reservation: “the ‘modern Japan' is a 
contradiction in terms, though it does exist.”3） While the Japanese claim and 
would like to believe that they have integrated the old genuine Japanese culture 
with the new Western scientific achievements, and thus have gone beyond 
the  latter, it was clear to Loewith's (viz., the outsider's) eye that their 
achievements remain “no more than an adaptation of Western methodology” 
for the sake of preserving genuine Japanese. In fact, the fundamental problem 
with modern Japan as Loewith sees it lies in this reductive circuit of treating 
everything Western merely as a means to the end that is traditionally 
conceived as the Japanese Spirit. That is precisely why he diagnosed the 
‘modern Japan' as “a contradiction in terms, though it does exist.” And it is 
perhaps unnecessary to remind you that it was a function of the emperor to 
make the existence of modern Japan as natural as possible and not “a 
contradiction in terms.” 
3） “The Japanese Mind: A Picture of the Mentality That We Must Understand If We Are To 
Conquer, ”Fortune vol. 28, no 6（New York, Dec. 1943），p.236.
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　　　　The happy amalgam of the wakon-yosai, which duly underwent 
Loewith's critical analysis in the late 1930s, was not to survive in the defeated 
nation after WWII, but it is conceivable that the mechanism of the reductive 
circuit where everything Western is brought to bear on the traditional Japanese 
remains inscribed as specifically national in the popular memory.
　(b) Divine tragedy and human comedy
If the above analysis has mainly dealt with the general characteristics of the 
imperial system that modern Japan invented, there are also those specific to 
Emperor Showa which could contribute in a direct way to the formation of the 
collective popular memory. It so happened during his long and eventful reign 
extending from 1926 through 1989 that he had the extraordinary experience of 
undergoing a divine tragedy and a human comedy. In the prewar period, from 
his enthronement to the collapse of the empire, he had been worshiped as a 
living god, whereas in the postwar era he became a man following the official 
declaration of the renunciation of his divinity.  Such a unique event, to the best 
of my knowledge, belongs to the rarities of human history. Obviously, there is 
nothing comparable about it either to the Christian incarnation or to the 
prophetic descent of the divine voice. Noteworthy is the very possibility of the 
transition or transference from divinity to man, which would be categorically 
inconceivable in monotheistic cultures. This fantastic transition, which indeed 
saved the nation-state at the crucial moment of national crisis, has however 
helped not only to preserve the extant contradictions in the nature and 
structure of modern Japan but also to reconfirm and strengthen that 
characteristically closed circuit which will treat everything foreign as a means 
to the national end. The national sphere, whose continuity was saved and 
secured by the transformation of Emperor Showa, may well seem to its 
8inhabitants to be smugly homogeneous and comfortably permanent but, 
needless to say, it has its own price to pay for its maintenance. 
4. By way of conclusion
We have been in search of the reasons why Japanese society came to a 
standstill at the imminent death of Emperor Showa between 1988 and 1989. My 
assumption has been that for such anachronistically pre-modern behaviour 
there must have been a strong undercurrent of repressed discontents of a 
politico-historical kind. And my diagnosis is that the discontents of modern 
Japan derive from the fundamentally self-protective nature and structure of its 
modernity. Its modernization was a forced affair, not of its own accord. Hence 
came about the feeling of self-victimization closely bound up with it; its 
contradictory character of being a revolution and at the same time a 
restoration; and its underlying structure of the closed circuit relegating 
everything foreign to the national and cultural end. And all this contradictorily 
charged memory was further reconfirmed through the peculiarities of historical 
contingency in the pre- and post-war period, symbolically represented by the 
drastic transformation of the emperor's body.4）
4）The present short essay is written as a sequel to my previous publications, “The Illusion 
of the Modern and the Pleasures of the Pre-Modern, ”Overcoming Postmodernism: 
“Overcoming Modernity”and Japan, eds., K. Doak & Y. Takada（Tokyo: Shubunkan, 
2002），and “Supreme Emtiness and Temporal Fulfillment: Two Versions of Political 
Failure?”，both of which are now included in my Transcendental Descent: Essays in 
Literature and Philosophy (The Center for Philosophy, The University of Tokyo, 2007).
